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THESIS

ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY

Analysis and Development of A Model of Islamic Democracy Based on Islam

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2 June 2003

Preface

This document is an *English* abstract (the beginning of chapter 1, chapter 6, and parts of chapter 7) from the original document, the complete thesis written in Danish.

Thus, to get the full understanding and benefit from our discussion on Islamic Democracy, one must adhere to the Danish issue. However, we think it is possible to get a good understanding of this theme by reading the following abstract.

Chapter 1 (pages 7-12) is an introduction including the important questions of the thesis. In chapter 6 (pages 133-153) we construct our model of Islamic democracy. This chapter is the core of the paper. Finally, the conclusion is in chapter 7 (pages 154-156).

Astrid & Christian

1. Introduction

1.1 Islam and Democracy – A Problem?

In this thesis, we have chosen the subject *Islam and democracy*. This is a highly politicalized subject, and we find traces of the researchers' and authors' different points of view, values, and interpretations in the literature concerning the subject. Among other things, this is expressed by the different researchers' conceptions of compatibility between Islam and democracy.¹ Often, the same Muslim thinkers² are praised by some as democrats while others regard them as Islamic fundamentalists.³

On a global level, the predominant view of democracy is closely related to the political tradition in the West, and it is often Western experience that forms the basis of definitions of democracy. For Muslim countries, it is important to raise the question whether a non-Western way to democracy and a *particular Islamic model of democracy* exist. Particularly, in connection with democracy to some degree identified with a certain Western model, a process of democratization may disagree with the special common identities of non-Western countries and may give rise to an accusation of cultural imperialism. When Western models of democracy are 'exported' to non-Western countries, the process of democratization may be viewed as a process introducing foreign and non-authentic institutions to these countries. Furthermore, in Muslim countries, beside the Western models, a competing concept of Islamic democracy exists. It is this Islamic democracy we would like to explore in our thesis – for many good reasons.

¹ We explore the different arguments against a combination of Islam and democracy in chapter 7.

² We use the word 'think' in connection with normative and abstract contributions that constitutes intellectual experiments on Islamic democracy.

³ **Black**, Antony (2001): *The History of Islamic Political Thought From the Prophet to the Present*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 31-323; **Boroumand**, Ladan & **Boroumand**, Roya (2002): 'Terror, Islam, and Democracy' in *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 13, no. 2 April 2002, pp. 8-9, 11-12; **Filali-Ansary**, Abdou Roya (1996): 'The Challenge of Secularisation' in *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 7, no. 2 April 1996, pp. 78-80; **Kubba**, Laith (1996): 'Recognizing Pluralism' in *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 7, no. 2 April 1996, p. 88.

1.2 Why Concern Oneself with Islam and Democracy?

First of all, during the last decades there has been a burst of Islamic identity in Muslim countries and among Muslim populations in Western countries. The start of this 'Islamic renaissance' is considered as having been caused by the take-over of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979.⁴ After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it was a widespread belief in the West that a real competing ideology to our liberal understanding of democracy no longer existed. Francis Fukuyama described this as 'The End of History'⁵. As it later became apparent, Islam has a strong potential to become precisely such a competing ideology. In the West, it has been a widespread belief that Western values like liberal democracy, pluralism, and the self-determination of the individual are universal. Others think that one global common culture does not exist and thus are spokespersons for cultural relativism.⁶ Each view contains paradoxes. For example, one may question whether it is an expression of democratic disposition to impose democracy on and secularize Muslim countries by force?

Secondly, the social breadth of the Islamic revival is wide-ranging and includes both well educated people and people living at subsistence level. At present, there are about 1,2 billions of Muslims in the world.⁷ There are 48 countries with Muslim majorities, and of these only less than one fourth are characterized as democratic by the organization Freedom House⁸. Islam is the world's fastest growing religion, and it is calculated that it will be the biggest in the world in thirty years. This is in particular due to an explosive growth of population in Muslim countries, and the number of Muslims in the world can be projected to about 3 billions at that time.⁹

So, it is relevant to examine the existing Islamic conceptions of democracy. A system of government combining Islam and democracy is what we call *Islamic democracy*. We assume,

⁴ **Basbous**, Antoine (2000): *L'islamisme – une révolution avortée?*. France : Hachette Littératures, p. 88.

⁵ **Fukuyama**, Francis (1992): *The End of History and the Last Man*. USA: The Free Press.

⁶ Relativism means regarding something as 'relatively'. Cultural relativists do not think, that values can be judged on a rational basis, but rather that they depend on cultural elements. **Lübche**, Poul (ed.) (1938): *Politikens filosofi leksikon*. Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag A/S. 1st ed. 1998, p. 367.

⁷ **Brix**, Helle Merete & **Hansen**, Torben (ed.) (2002): *Islam i Vesten – På Koranens vej? En antologi*. Copenhagen: Tiderne skifter, p. 11.

⁸ **Pittelkow**, Ralf (2002): *Efter 11. september. Vesten og islam*. Danmark: Lindhardt og Ringhof. 1st ed. p. 111. Freedom House is an American, non-profit, independent organisation, which was founded almost 60 years ago by Eleanor Roosevelt and others.

⁹ Brix & Hansen (2002), p. 11.

that an Islamic democracy shall have a better possibility of being recognized in the Muslim populations than a secular¹⁰ Western system of democracy. This takes us to the presentation of our principal question and the three sub-questions.

1.3 Principal Question and Sub-questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine: *How can Islam and democracy be united in a model of Islamic democracy?* This is also the principal question.

The subject *Islam and Democracy* has occupied many, in particular Arabian and Persian thinkers, for the last couple of hundred years, but gradually also some Western thinkers have touched upon the subject. Since the end of the 1980's and especially after 11 September 2001, much literature has been published concerning this subject.

So far, most researchers have concentrated on four debates: (1) On democratic progress in Muslim countries, i.e. empirical studies of political processes in these countries in order to demonstrate to what extent the governments can or cannot be described as democratic. (2) Whether Islamic fundamentalism is a threat and if it will spread to more moderately Muslim countries and even to non-Muslim countries. (3) Whether Islam should be regarded primarily as a religious or a political process. Finally, (4) whether Islam is compatible with democracy.¹¹

Our thesis is part of the fourth debate as we examine *how* Islam and democracy can be united or combined. In this way, our thesis is a contribution to the discussion of Islam and democracy.¹²

However, in our work with this thesis – in spite of a comprehensive information retrieval – we have not come across a ‘concrete’ model of Islamic democracy. By concrete we mean a model making more specific statements about the political structure of the state and the connections among the political institutions. Thus, we hope to contribute with a proposal for such

¹⁰ By secular we mean a separation of politics and religion.

¹¹ **Price**, David E. (1999): *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights. A Comparative Study*. London: Praeger Publishers, p. 21; **Goddard**, Hugh (2002): ‘Islam and Democracy’ in *The Political Quarterly*. Vol. 72, no. 1 January 2002, p. 3.

¹² As there is no survey over previous research within this subject, we have worked out a survey (see appendix 1).

a model. In order to answer the principal question, we have formulated three sub-questions, each of which contributes to the model while supplementing each other.

The first sub-question (1) is: ***What can be understood by a model of Islamic democracy?***

This is a basic question. We must know the contents of a model of Islamic democracy. It is our aim to answer this question by going through contributions from four researchers and thinkers, each of whom has an idea of how to unite Islam and democracy. They all contribute with elements that help us understand and develop a model of Islamic democracy. After going through the individual thinkers, we shall create a synthesis of the elements, and this we call the *model of synthesis*. Thus, the model of synthesis will be the answer to the first sub-question, and it is this model we shall further develop in this thesis.¹³

As our criterion for a model of Islamic democracy is that it can still be identified as democratic, it is necessary to examine to what degree the model of synthesis is not sufficiently democratic. So we have taken Robert A. Dahl's¹⁴ definition of democracy as our point of departure, and as our second sub-question we shall examine (II): ***To what degree can the model of synthesis be characterized as democratic according to Robert Dahl's models of democracy?*** Here we shall compare the model of synthesis with Dahl's ideal¹⁵ for democracy (normative) and his practical model of Western democracy (polyarchy). The reason we have chosen Dahl is that his ideas are classic within theories of democracy.¹⁶ It is important to examine to what degree the model of synthesis is democratic according to main-stream criteria. If it does not in any way resemble a classic model of democracy, it is a question whether it is entitled to the term 'model of democracy'. By studying differences and similarities among the model of synthesis and Dahl's models, we get more precise information about how the Islamic conception

¹³ The thinkers we have included are the Euro-Islam speaker Tariq Ramadan, the two American Islam-researchers John L. Esposito & John O. Voll, the intellectual Mohammed Khatami, President of Iran, and the philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush. In chapter 3, it is described who these thinkers are and our criteria for choosing them.

¹⁴ Dahl, Robert A. (2000): *Om demokrati*. Viborg: Nyt Nordisk Forlag.

¹⁵ This ideal must not be confused with the concept of ideal type. Dahl's ideal is the desired result while an ideal type is a tool and a construction of thoughts not necessarily worth aiming at.

¹⁶ See Chapter 4 for more details concerning the choice of Dahl.

of democracy differs from a Western model of democracy. In this way, we can find out which elements from the Islamic model we should attach importance to on the basis of a democratic point of view and which elements that could possibly be eliminated.

One thing is a model which is an intellectual experiment, the ‘difficult reality’ is quite another matter. So, by application of two cases we examine whether practical experience from a Muslim reality can add more realistic elements to the model of synthesis and support the model empirically. Also, we hope to fill up possible gaps in the model of synthesis with elements from these countries. In order to clarify this, we shall take a close look at how Iran and Turkey have tried to solve the question of democratic relevance, e.g. concerning rights of religious minorities and the status of women. We have chosen Iran and Turkey from 48 countries with Muslim majorities due to several facts, of which the most important are that Iran and Turkey are supposed to represent the extremes concerning state buildings in Muslim countries. Where Iran is the prototype of an Islamic state, Turkey is close to a Western model of democracy. Also, both countries are supposed to be in a process where they from each of their extremes in some ways approach an Islamic democracy, i.e. Iran under President Khatami is moving towards a more public participation and a softening of the religious regime, and since 2002 Turkey has had an Islamic party in power.¹⁷ So, by means of the third and last sub-question (III) we examine: *Can the two cases, Iran and Turkey, contribute with supplementary elements to the Islamic model of democracy?*

On the basis of the answers to the three sub-questions, we shall construct a model of Islamic democracy. The ‘final’ model we call *the model of Islamocracy*. This word is a hybrid of an Islamic (isla-) and democratic (mo-) kind of government (-cracy). The reason we have chosen this specific name is primarily to separate it from the model of synthesis in the thesis. Secondly, we want to demonstrate that the model is *our* idea of how Islam and democracy can be united in a model of Islamic democracy.

The model of Islamocracy, which is a further development of the model of synthesis, corrected in the view of Dahl’s conception of democracy and supplemented with relevant ele-

¹⁷ See Chapter 5 for more details concerning the choice of cases.

ments from the political systems in Iran and Turkey, does not form the final ‘truth’ about Islamic democracy. So, we also discuss whether the model can and must be supplemented in some areas in order to allow for democratic relevant areas such as rights of religious (non-Muslim) minorities.¹⁸ Viewed in the light of these facts, one might question the characteristics of our thesis and the methodical considerations that have been applied when carrying out the analysis. We shall answer these questions in the next passage before we explain, in short, in the last part of this introduction, how the thesis is constructed.

¹⁸ We have had to refrain from treating many relevant viewpoints and topics due to the limited extent of the thesis. We have selected our material both in consideration of the thinkers we include and the empirical methods we analyse. Also, we have made a choice concerning which Western theoretical model of democracy to use as our frame of reference. Furthermore, Islam is not the only ‘obstacle’ for a democratic development in Muslim countries, e.g. relations such as system of government, economy, natural resources, colonial past, tradition, and history. We shall not touch upon these conditions.

6. How Can Islam and Democracy Be United in A Model of Islamic Democracy?

After having answered the three sub-questions in the previous chapters, it is time to answer the primary question of the thesis.

As mentioned in the introduction, it is our aim to combine Islam and democracy in one model and in this way contribute with something new to the debate about Islam and democracy. We demanded that this model of Islamic democracy could still be identified as democratic. This is the question we are now going to answer by finishing the development of our model, the one we finally call the *Islamocracy*.

The development of the model of Islamocracy draws on the model of synthesis from chapter 3, the conclusions about democracy from chapter 4, and the empirical contributions from chapter 5. The process in the development of the model is: (1) to sum up and incorporate previously known solutions (a synthesis of chapters 3, 4, and 5). (2) to make up our minds about the options concerning unsolved problems that we have touched upon in previous chapters.

In one case, we have to depart from these rules. To the question about handling a minority in an Islamic democracy, we have not yet found a sufficient solution. However, we do have a few useful elements, but in order to finish the model in connection with this important matter we have to include Will Kymlicka's³⁹⁵ theory about the rights of minorities. In other respects, we refrain from bringing up *new* conclusions which do not build on the previous chapters.³⁹⁶

The chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the elements of Islamic democracy are gradually put together to one model, the Islamocracy. In the second part, we shall sum up and visualize this model.

³⁹⁵ **Kymlicka**, Will (1995): *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kymlicka is a Canadian professor in philosophy who has occupied himself exhaustively with minorities and multicultural rights.

³⁹⁶ Where we have ideas and proposals of our own, these shall be shown in the footnotes in order to emphasize that they are not included in the model.

6.1 The Shaping of The Islamocracy

This is how the model of Islamocracy will be put together. First, we shall take a look at the elements which are going to form the basis of the model of Islamocracy. Then we shall look at the constitution and the question of sovereignty. We shall go through freedoms and rights and how minority problems may be solved, and we shall touch upon matters concerning civil society, democratic procedures, the interpretation of Islam, and the constitution. Finally, we shall look at questions concerning the institutions such as power-sharing, the guardian of the constitution, and locally based democracy.

The reason why we have found these areas relevant is that they are all essential democratic elements.

The Basis of The Model

Before we can start constructing the model of Islamocracy, we need a point of departure or a basis on which we can 'build' the model. Naturally, the model already has contents as we have build up essential elements in the three previous chapters, and in some aspects we have already finished developing the model. By 'starting the construction' we mean that the model is put together bit by bit. We do this in order to explain why the Islamocracy is going to look precisely like this.

In chapter 2, we mentioned that the basis of Islam is the Koran and *Sunna* (the usual practice of the prophet). In the words of Ramadan, they form the principal sources of Islam, and so it is these sources we have chosen as our *Islamic basis*. This we have done because these two elements together form the basis of Islam no matter which Islamic persuasion you belong to. Thus, they can be viewed as a minimum Islamic common denominator, and without them our model could not justly be called Islamic.

We have found our *democratic basis* in chapter 4, where we went through Dahl's criteria and demands concerning the ideal and the real democracy. Both criteria and demands were drawn up, the purpose of which was to obtain *political equality*, and this is why we have chosen this element as our democratic basis.

The Constitution

The constitution must be the reference point of the state and the society. Also, it must be the legal background, where *the basis and principles of Islam and democracy are balanced*. This was evident already from the model of synthesis.

The constitution is a 'written constitution', and the elaboration has a resemblance to that of a Western constitution with democratic principles such as justice (which is also an Islamic principle), human rights, and a limitation of the power of the state. Especially Soroush has contributed with these elements in chapter 3. But, at the same time, the constitution also contains Islamic principles from the Koran and *Sunna* (the usual practice of the prophet), including the concepts of *tawhid* (the unity of God), *risalat* (the prophecy), and *khilafat* (caliphate or representative). These concepts contain both something very Islamic, e.g. the concept of the unity of God, and also something very democratic, such as the idea that all humans are equal (to Allah) and are Allah's representatives on Earth. Thus, the concepts can also be viewed as the social contract that bind together the people, the state, and Allah, and so we find it essential to the stability of the Islamocracy.

As previously mentioned, we are convinced that it is *the weighting* between the Islamic and the democratic elements that determines the extent of democracy in the Islamocracy. In chapter 4, we chose the A-variant of the model of synthesis, as it was the most democratic one of the variants despite the fact that its democracy is not sufficient. The extent of democracy is made more specific below. It is not our aim to eliminate all non-democratic elements, because then we would not end up with an Islamic democracy. On the contrary, we shall try to make the Islamocracy as democratic as possible without entering into a compromise with the basic Islamic elements.

However, on one point we would like to take a stand. We think that it should be Ramadan's concept of *sharia* that defines the Islamic principles in the constitution. By *sharia* Ramadan does not mean the Islamic legal system, but rather the Islamic kind of life, i.e. 'the good life'. In other words, it must be made more specific in the constitution how to establish a state so it fulfils the values and aims of the Islamic way of life. So, it is the *intentions* of the Koran and *Sunna* (the usual practice of the prophet) that the constitution has to concretize and not if a person should be punished by having five cuts of a whip for littering in the streets.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁷ Ramadan uses the word *maqasid* (the intent of the sources) about this interpretation. For more details see paragraph 3.1.

This is the reason why we apply Ramadan's interpretation of the concept.

Like in Iran and Turkey, a referendum is held before the constitution is adopted, in this case, however, in free circumstances, and it can be changed as occasion requires.³⁹⁸

Sovereignty

In the A-variant of the model of synthesis, *all citizens have limited sovereignty under Allah*.

This concept of sovereignty is another essential concept which must be made more specific in the constitution. Despite the fact that this concept includes all citizens, we recognize its democratic limitations. Yet, we think that it is this variation that maintains the Islamic elements while at the same time it makes room for as much sovereignty as possible. In this way, we find that the concept obtains double legitimacy by most Muslims (religious and democratic legitimacy) and also that it is perceived as legitimate by all other citizens (democratic legitimacy), as they still have their (limited) sovereignty. Among the faults of this concept, we find that the limited sovereignty under Allah clearly is a limitation of the participatory democracy that Dahl mentions. This is due to the fact that the principles of Islam will result in some kind of limitation in connection with what can be determined, obtained an insight in, or placed on the agenda. Chapter 4 showed this very clearly. We assume that this limitation is to be felt most unacceptable to non-Muslims, as they are the ones who cannot immediately recognize the principles. How we shall solve this problem is explained below.

Freedoms and Rights

It is a basic rule that in the Islamocracy all are equal to the law, i.e. *in principle everybody has the same freedoms and rights*. This has been decided in accordance with the A-variant which grants comprehensive civil rights. We find that such rights are fundamental if no persons or groups are to be excluded. It is essential in order to ensure civil rights in the Islamocracy, because the Islamic democracy is based on one ideology that not all citizens fully support. By generally increasing freedoms and rights in society, we simultaneously increase the extent of democracy and the legitimacy of non-Muslims in our model.

³⁹⁸ One can imagine, that possible constitutional amendments can only be carried out if both a majority of e.g. 5/6 of the members of the legislative assembly and a majority of e.g. 2/3 of the population approve of the amendments. The reason why one cannot be satisfied with a majority in the legislative assembly is that you have to ensure that changes are made in accordance with the wishes of the people.

A recurring Islamic feature found in all our thinkers from Chapter 3 was the right of justice. Our weighting of freedoms and rights should be seen especially in the light of this justice which is also an equality among the citizens in the country.

For example, Ramadan has mentioned that freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and conscience are necessary in order to go through the confession of faith. We shall not go into details with all these civil rights, but we would like to mention that we regard the freedom of speech as very important to an efficient participatory democracy, to justified insight, and to the control of the agenda. The citizens must have the right to express themselves about political topics and to criticize representatives or the economic system without risking punishment or fear for freedoms getting cut down. The limited sovereignty under Allah naturally sets certain limits to how fundamentally the predominant ideology can be changed, but within the frames of the constitution one must be able to criticize the interpretation of the Koran and *Sunna* (the usual practice of the prophet). The freedom of assembly is also essential in our model, because it ensures that citizens can obtain some of the rights that make the democratic system work. This also applies to participation in interest groups, political parties, and the like. The freedom of conscience is also an important topic in the Islamocracy which we shall discuss later.

One other important part of the Islamic principle of justice is the right of social justice. In chapter 5, we found that in order to obtain a healthy economy with a social latitude it is necessary to introduce some kind of market economy. In order to maintain the Islamic principle of social justice, the economic system in our model of Islamocracy will be a market economy combined with a kind of Islamic welfare model. Dahl, too, emphasizes market economy as a precondition for democracy.

Another important area is the status of women. Both the model of synthesis, Dahl, and the conclusions from the analysis of the two cases have shown that women should have the same rights as men. This is necessary in order to obtain political legitimacy in half of the population as women usually form one half of a population in a country. One may ask, if Muslims will accept sex equality? The example from Turkey clearly showed that it is possible without becoming less Muslim. It is of great importance that women are educated, and taking Turkey for a model, the education in the Islamocracy should be partly secularized. Here, it was clearly shown that a partly or completely secularized system of education is an important part of sex equality. By 'partly secularized' we mean that there must be room for religious

education together with a more secularized education and that the secular education should also contain religious subjects. In this way, we combine the experiences from Turkey with the ideas of Khatami. That women obtain the same rights as men in our model also means that women do not have to wear veils if they do not want to.

Finally, we would like to draw attention to the fact that even if all citizens are politically equal and in principle have the same freedoms and rights, the limited sovereignty under Allah imposes some restrictions, and such restrictions can be crucial for the extent of democracy in the model.

Minorities

An obvious problem in an Islamic democracy would be if the majority chooses a very strict interpretation of Islam, which will impose strong limitations on e.g. non-Muslims. Chapter 5 has shown that even if everybody formally has equal rights in Turkey, a minority will be subject to the decisions of the majority. How severe the strain will be for non-Muslims is very much a question of whether the minority is given special privileges. So far, the question of handling minorities has not been answered satisfactorily, and so we shall briefly introduce a new theory.

We have chosen Will Kymlicka's theory, because he comes up with some useful rights concerning groups, which we think would be applicable in an Islamic democracy. These rights for groups unite and organize in a clear way the few useful experiences we have got so far from the analysis concerning minorities. Also, he combines individual and collective rights in a constructive way.

First, Kymlicka's three different rights for groups, the so-called citizenships, are examined, and then we shall look at these rights compared to more individual rights.

The rights for groups, or the *group-differentiated rights*, are very important for pluralistic communities, i.e. communities with e.g. ethnic or religious minorities. This is due to the fact that they help reducing the vulnerability of the minority in case of economic pressure or political decisions by the majority in the community.³⁹⁹ These rights can also be used for granting a group external protection. The three group-differentiated rights are: (1) rights of self-government, (2) polyethnic rights, and (3) special representation rights.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁹ Kymlicka (1995) p. 38.

The right of self-government implies the transfer of power to local political institutions. This is important in order to avoid voting down minorities in decisions which are essential to their cultures. Among other things, this applies to areas such as education, resource development, language, and law of domestic relations.⁴⁰¹ According to Kymlicka, federalism is the most common way to guarantee rights of self-government. However, he draws our attention to the fact that federalism can only serve as a mechanism for self-government if the minority in question forms a majority in one of the regional areas.⁴⁰² We have seen this in chapter 4, where we described that the limited sovereignty may be met by some kind of autonomy. Dahl mentioned in particular the federal state as a possibility. Also, the example from Iran has shown the idea of extending the self-government in those areas where minorities form a majority. Whether an Islamic democracy has to be a federation or a unitary state, this should be decided according to the conditions of the individual countries. Local laws should be applied here, e.g. the jurisprudence of the religion in question, without offence against the basic principles of the constitution. This is an idea from Iran, too.

The second of the group-differentiated rights is *polyethnic rights*. These rights protect cultural and religious characteristics that are not protected by the market, e.g. through programs with private support, or characteristics that are often, unintentionally, put into unfavourable positions because of the legislation.⁴⁰³ The purpose of these rights is not to encourage self-government but to hasten the integration process in society, and so the polyethnic rights must also be part of the Islamocracy, e.g. one polyethnic right could be the right not to have to wear veils at work.

The last of Kymlicka's three group-differentiated rights is *the special representation rights*. A permanent number of seats in a political institution could be an example of these rights. They are important, because they reduce the probability of minorities being ignored when decisions are made on a nation-wide basis.⁴⁰⁴ This is the reason why we chose to incorporate special representation rights in the Islamocracy model, which will ensure that minorities have a permanent representation and reduce the possibility of political marginalization. Also, like in

⁴⁰⁰ Kymlicka (1995) pp. 27-30.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 37-38.

⁴⁰² Ibid., pp. 27, 29.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., pp. 30-31, 38.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 37.

Iran, it must be possible to be put on trial with a judge of your own faith, so that the code of practice for minorities will be represented in the court of law.

We shall add the three group-differentiated rights as supplementary rights to the constitution. They will contribute to a reduction of the democratic demerits for minorities, especially non-Muslims. Also, some of the side-effects of the limited sovereignty can be warded off in this way. Before we leave Kymlicka, we shall see how he combines the more individual rights with the collective ones, which we have examined above.

Kymlicka operates with two concepts: external protection and internal restrictions.

External protection is protection of the group against external matters.⁴⁰⁵ This may be the protection of a group against something that threatens to destabilize it from outside, e.g. the code of practice of another group. This includes the three group-differentiated rights.

Internal restrictions are restrictions protecting the group against its own members.⁴⁰⁶

A member might be a breakaway who will suddenly not follow the group traditions, e.g. concerning how to dress.

It is in connection with the internal restrictions that the individual rights (also) are of great significance as a protection of a minority. Kymlicka finds that only the external rights are justified within a liberal or democratic frame. He argues that internal restrictions will cause an offence against the individual rights, such as the freedom of speech.⁴⁰⁷ By allowing internal restrictions in a community, you simultaneously remove the right of a member of a group to question or revise the authority or practices of a certain tradition. Thus, the individual rights are important in order to ensure that the group rights do not give one group privileges on behalf of some other and does not cause inconvenience. This would be the case if internal restrictions were allowed.

By *combining the individual rights with the collective rights for groups* in this way, the group rights prevent that one group dominates another, and at the same time the individual rights prevent a group from oppressing its own members. On the basis of this combination of rights, the majority can give the minority many group-differentiated rights without sacrificing the freedom of the individual. In other words, in the model of Islamocracy there must be equality

⁴⁰⁵ Kymlicka (1995), p. 35.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

among groups and equality and freedom within the groups. In order to obtain this we have to differentiate between external protection and internal restrictions in the constitution. The first should be allowed while the second should not.

Finally, we conclude that Kymlicka has come up with a solution concerning the minority problems, which at the same time includes the results from our analysis. In other words, we have defined a citizenship for minorities which corresponds with the comprehensive citizenship, which the A-variant from the model of synthesis granted. Kymlicka adds that it should be forbidden to force religious values on groups or individuals, yet it should not impose limitations on the rights of freedom. This also was an example from Iran, where it is forbidden to non-Muslims to try to convert Muslims.⁴⁰⁸ In the model of Islamocracy, we extend this to all minority groups. It is emphasized, that converting is allowed if any individual chooses so, even if some Muslims may not accept this. This is to be linked to the freedom of conscience in the model.

Civil Society

In the Islamocracy, civil society, among other things, should be based on participation, thinking, independent media, and opposition. These elements were mentioned in the three previous chapters.

The experience from Iran has shown that *participation* is a necessary precondition if the attitude of the state is to reflect that of the people. Participation can take place through political parties, interest groups, or simply by running as a candidate or voting at elections. As we saw from the model of synthesis, the right of self-determination is also obtained by participation.

According to Khatami, *thinking* means development of the civil society through dissemination of religious knowledge. This can influence ‘the achievement of justified insight’ which Dahl mentioned. We interpret thinking as including general knowledge, too. We have already under the status of women touched upon the importance of education, and to us thinking includes education. According to Dahl, the achievement of justified insight implies that everybody must have equal opportunity for getting information about alternative politics and its

⁴⁰⁸ Kymlicka (1995), p. 154.

consequences. Dahl also mentioned that it is important to have institutions for competence development. In the Islamocracy, such (educational) institutions include both the secular education (Turkey), e.g. medical studies, or the religious education (Khatami), which educates the people ethically. Thinking must be spread as much as possible, and for this purpose modern progress like computers and the internet are useful. In continuation of the ideas of Khatami concerning education for as many young people as possible, we also think that this should include compulsory schooling up to a certain age group. This is important in order to eradicate illiteracy.

In chapter 4, it was described how the possibility of information about alternative politics demands *independent media*, and so we find that this should be part of civil society. Independent media will be necessary for an efficient participatory democracy, the justified insight, and the control of the agenda. In other words, the citizens must have the right to get independent and alternative information which is not controlled by the government and which is efficiently protected by law. As much alternative information as possible should be accessible so that the voters themselves can participate in adjusting the interpretation of the Islamic principles.

Concerning *the opposition*, we found in chapter 3 that *ikhtilaf* (disagreement) is a very useful concept, as it makes room for the opposition including disagreement as long as it is within the frames of the basic principles of Islam. So, differences of opinion are allowed concerning the interpretation of Islam. The forbidden or illegal opposition is the one that causes civil disorder. Naturally, this imposes certain limitations on the freedom of speech, but by civil disorder we think of violent civil disorder in particular, and as the monopoly of power in our opinion should be with the state, we do not regard this limitation as a problem. It is a demand, however, that the civil disorder is defined as concretely and narrowly as possible. In short, the opposition must be allowed within the frames of the constitution.

Finally, we would like to point out that civil society is more than what we have gone through now, but as the most essential elements have been included, we shall just emphasize that in order to stabilize the Islamocracy and make it democratically sustainable, it demands a *well-developed civil society*.

Procedures

In this paragraph, we shall first take a look at elections and then at other basic democratic procedures.

In the Islamocracy, there must be just, free, secret, and frequent *elections* in order to ensure the fulfilment of Dahl's democratic criteria of equality at elections and control of the agenda. Civil rights in the A-variant includes the right for all citizens (above a fixed age limit) to vote for elected representatives. Citizens have rights to offer themselves as candidates for elections and to organize in political parties as long as they are not sentenced for serious crimes. This applies to everybody irrespective of sex and ethnic or religious affiliations.

As mentioned previously in connection with Dahl, there are different kinds of electoral systems. One extreme, which has been emphasized, is election by proportional representation. This kind of electoral system is more just than election by a majority vote in single-member constituencies concerning the representation. However, the latter will give a more efficient government, as it usually results in the development of a dual party system. As we have decided that minorities must have a permanent representation in the elected assembly, we choose the electoral system with a majority vote in single-member constituencies. We find that possibly it will make the question of interpretation easier in connection with an official interpretation of Islam. At the same time, the permanent number of seats in the elected assembly will ensure that minorities obtain permanent representation. Also, the discussion about a high or low minimum percentage of the votes necessary for a party to be represented in parliament becomes less pertinent in an electoral system based on election by a majority vote.⁴⁰⁹

The most essential procedures in the political system of Islamocracy are *shura* (consultation) and *ijma* (consensus). As we have shown in the model of synthesis, *shura* is a method of delegating the limited sovereignty of the people to an elected assembly (the A-variant). *Ijma* (consensus) is more of a decision making process. In the synthesis, from a functional point of view, we rewrote *ijma* in order to make it applicable to the majority principle. Thus, the

⁴⁰⁹ This is due to the fact that a majority vote in single-member constituencies already operates with the principle 'the winner takes it all'. This means that even if the person with the second highest number of votes in a constituency gets e.g. 30 percent of the votes, this person will not be elected, as it is only the one with the highest number of votes who wins. In this case, one may say that there is a minimum of 30 percent of the votes necessary for a party to be represented in parliament.

elected assembly must legislate and interpret in accordance with this principle, where *ijma* supports both the method of election for the assembly and the method in the assembly.

The Interpretation of Islam

One of the major questions about the organization of the Islamocracy is the interpretation of Islam.

It is obvious that in any Islamic democracy there will be different conceptions of how Islam is to be interpreted. This we have seen in chapter 2. From chapter 3, it appeared that the concept of *ijtihad* was interpreted in different ways by our thinkers. We could summarize the meaning of the concept as the real implementation of the Laws of Allah. The same chapter showed that the agreement between laws and Islam must be decided by either the elected assembly or the men of learning. The A-variant of the model of synthesis dictates that it must be the elected institutions which on the basis of the principle of consensus (principle of majority election) decide how to interpret the principles of Islam. The experiences from Iran made it obvious that the official interpretation should be in accordance with the wishes of the people, if possible, and at the same time the example with the two *de facto* parallel political systems showed that it is a bad idea if the men of learning come into power. In order to comply with these conclusions and at the same time respect the basic principles of Islam, we suggest that the ones who perform the official interpretation should be *elected ulamas* (religious men of learning).⁴¹⁰

The ulamas must produce new interpretations of the Islamic principles that are adaptable to the context in question and which can be put into practise as more concrete laws. In this way,

⁴¹⁰ In the Islamocracy, we define a *ulama* (a religious man of learning) as a person who, irrespective of sex, age, etc. has a degree from one of the religious (Islamic) universities in the country. It is a common definition. Simonsen (2001), p. 171. Fundamentally, the definition means that anyone who has such a degree may call himself/herself a *ulama* (religious man of learning). On the basis of the experiences from Iran, where the religious councils almost form a state in the state, we suggest that the parliament appoints the leaders of the religious universities. This will ensure that the universities will not only reflect the interests of the *ulamas*, as, in this way, they will find it more difficult to establish their own power elite in the state.

Ramadan makes the following demands on a *ulama* (religious man of learning), which one might consider applying. In order to perform *ijtihad* (efforts to derive laws) at least two conditions should be fulfilled: A profound understanding of *sharia* (the aim of the Islamic way of life), and a mastery of the different methods of deduction and derivation on the basis of knowledge and understanding. A man of learning who is recognized as competent for performing *ijtihad* must fulfil seven conditions: (1) knowledge of Arabian language, (2) insight of the Koran and *hadiths* (the sciences of handed down traditions), (3) profound knowledge of the purpose of *sharia*, (4) knowledge of the questions of which there is a general agreement, which makes it necessary to know the works dealing with secondary matters, (5) knowledge of the principles and methods of conclusion by analogy, (6) knowledge of the historical, social, and political context, and (7) recognition as a competent, honest, reliable, and upright person. Ramadan (2002), pp. 111, 298.

by having elected religious men of learning, we obtain both Islamic and democratic legitimacy. We have earlier mentioned that elections should be frequent, and the election of these *ulamas* (religious men of learning) should be effectuated continuously without any men of learning being prevented from running as candidates.⁴¹¹ This will ensure, that the interpretation of the principles of Islam shall be in accordance with the wishes of the people all the time, and thus, the Islamic fundament of the law shall be renewed continuously. This must be combined with an Islamic point of departure in the constitution, which must be open and sympathetic to the interpretational wishes of the people. We shall later look at how the institution with the elected *ulamas* (religious men of learning) could be organized.

Taught by experience from Turkey, we find that one *official interpretation of Islam* deeply rooted in the constitution is necessary in order to prevent the spreading of radical interpretations of Islam, e.g. in the schools. We have also learned that there is no need for a detailed official interpretation. Thus, the official interpretation should make room for a more *private interpretation* in cases where there is no need for unification, e.g. concerning the way women dress. On the other hand, there should be no possibility of interpretation in cases such as equal rights for women, which should be made explicit in the constitution. In short, there should be both an official interpretation of Islam carried out by the *ulamas* (religious men of learning) and a more private interpretation of Islam for the individual citizen.

Rule of Law

In the model of synthesis, we concluded that the model of Islamocracy must be based on the principles of the rule of law, ensuring equality, freedom, and justice. These principles go well together with the concept of *tawhid*, which means that all human beings are equal to Allah. The most concrete way to implement the rule of law is to make all equal before the law. This means that an independent court of justice securing the rule of law must be developed, in which everybody irrespective of position, sex, age, etc., can be put on trial.

Power-sharing

In the model of synthesis, the institutional power-sharing was a tripartition. It consists of the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, which we shall now discuss.

⁴¹¹ E.g. election every 4 years.

The *executive* is constituted by the government with the head of the government as its leader. In principle, there are two ways to form such a government, either as a parliamentary or a presidential system of government. In the Islamocracy, it is going to be a parliamentary system of government, as Dahl prefers this possibility. The primary reason for this choice has been that in this case the head of the government can be unseated by the parliament, and in this way he is responsible to the elected assembly all the time. The characteristics of the parliamentary system are that the leader of the government, which in this case we have called the Prime Minister, and his Cabinet are responsible to the legislative. This means that the government is dependent on the confidence of the legislative, and it can be removed by a vote of no confidence. Also, the Prime Minister in the parliamentary system is usually appointed by the legislative assembly.⁴¹² It is also this assembly that eventually approves the government. The government usually introduces all bills that must be introduced to and approved by the legislative assembly. Both the approval of government and bills are carried out in accordance with *ijma* (consensus on the basis of the principles of majority election).

As previously mentioned (in the model of synthesis), an elected assembly must form the *legislative*, i.e. a parliament which we have called *Shura I*. We think the name is suitable for an Islamic democracy, as the concept of *shura* means consultation in Arabic, the same meaning as the word 'parliamentum' has in Latin.⁴¹³ The name *Shura I* is due to the fact that there is also a *Shura II*. In other words, we choose a parliamentary system with two chambers. The reason for choosing a bicameral system is that a second chamber or upper chamber provides good possibilities for the representation of the *ulamas* (the religious men of learning) in the political system. The solution with two chambers emerged from chapter 4. Even if the upper chamber (*Shura II*) in many ways resembles an ordinary upper chamber, it also has many characteristics which makes it untraditional. We shall later discuss this in detail.

The members of *Shura I* are called caliphs, and caliphs is the word Esposito & Voll use about the representatives of Allah. The Members of Parliament will be the representatives of Allah, but they will also be the representatives of the people, as they are elected by the people at majority elections. The caliphs (the Members of Parliament) must legislate in accordance with

⁴¹² In a presidential system, the head of the government, who is always a president, has been elected for a certain period in accordance with the constitution and usually cannot be removed by a vote of no confidence from the legislative assembly. Usually, the president is elected by the people. **Lijphart**, Arend (1999): *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. London: Yale University Press, p. 117.

⁴¹³ **Knudsen**, Tim (ed.) (2000): *Kernebegreber i statskundskab*. Copenhagen: Forlaget Thomson A/S. p. 88.

the principles of the constitution, and where the sources of the constitution are silent, there is a possibility for a legislative latitude. *Ijtihad* is the political latitude which allows an interpretation of the constitution according to time and place. The interpretation is used for Islamic law-making, which is also called *fiqh*. Ramadan mentions that especially in the part of *fiqh* (Islamic law) which is called *muamalat* (social relations), there is much room for interpretation. However, we have to point out that even if there is some room for interpretation in Shura I and the government concerning the elaboration of bills, it is in Shura II that the official interpretation of Islam is placed. This is due to the fact that the official interpretation of Islam is carried out by the *ulamas* (religious men of learning).

The members of Shura I debate all bills, which must be passed in accordance with *ijma* (consensus or the principle of majority). When a bill has been passed, it becomes a draft bill, which also has to be passed in Shura II. However, in this case it is more a kind of control of the constitutional relations, not a real political approval. If the members of Shura II do not pass the draft bill, it will be returned to Shura I for a revision before it is read once more in Shura II.

All draft bills have to be passed in Shura II before they become legislation, and Shura II has the final word in case of a disagreement.⁴¹⁴

The **judiciary** consists of independent courts of justice and its most important task is to secure the rule of law. It provides justice by making all equal before the law and by judging in accordance with the Islamic principles of equality and prohibitions of discrimination. The model of synthesis showed this, too. The courts of justice consist of a number of religious judges with law degrees from the religious universities. Soroush mentioned explicitly that religion must be the judge in a religious democracy. The judiciary is appointed by Shura I and Shura II, each appointing half of the members. This is done in order to ensure a composition as broad as possible in the judiciary and also to ensure the religious influence (*ulamas*) and secular influence (caliphs) of the composition. At the same time, this will ensure that the appointments fulfil the demands of the constitution in a better way in order to balance the Islamic and

⁴¹⁴ Furthermore, we suggest that if $\frac{3}{4}$ or more of the members of Shura I vote for a draft bill, which is not passed in Shura II, Shura I has the right to demand that a referendum is held. Here it is settled by means of *ijma*, i.e. the principle of majority vote. We find that this possibility is essential because the *ulamas* (religious men of learning) have their right of veto reduced in connection with the interpretation of the constitution. The members of Shura II will always know that if there is wide support for a draft bill in Shura I, there will be a risk that they may sustain a defeat, so we assume that they will be more flexible.

democratic elements. The example from Iran showed that if only one person appoints the judges, the judiciary will not be independent. In chapter 4, we discussed whether judges should be appointed for life or for a certain period. We think that a fixed period would be most appropriate, as it would probably ensure that the interpretations by the judges would be close to those of the people. Inspired by the example from Iran, where religious minorities can be put on trial with a judge belonging to the same faith, we think that this should also be the case in our model.

The religious judges pass judgment on the basis of explicit law as it is concretized by the two elected Shuras in common. In other words, there must only be interpretations of the (half secular) laws which have been passed, and the task of the courts of justice is to judge in accordance with the laws in force. As the laws in question are already subject to control whether or not they live up to the constitution in Shura II, the courts of justice shall not take a position on these matters. In this way, we avoid that judges, who are not elected, have the right to interpret the constitution.

The Guardian of The Constitution

After having discussed the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, we shall take a closer look at the concept we have called the guardian of the constitution. In the model of synthesis, we saw that this ‘guardian’ consisted of religious men of learning, and in Turkey it consisted of the National Security Council.

In the Islamocracy, the guardian of the constitution is Shura II, and the members are elected *ulamas* (religious men of learning).⁴¹⁵ The function of Shura II as an upper chamber has been discussed, but it should be added that Shura II because of this function works as a kind of ‘fourth power’, which ensures, that the legislative (Shura I) and executive power stay within the limits of the constitution. Shura II could also be called the ‘controlling power’ as the *ulamas* control the legislation. This is why we have called this institution the guardian of the constitution.

⁴¹⁵ Concerning the method of election for Shura II, we suggest that one *ulama* is chosen from each province, region, or county as a representative for the province, region or county in question. This means that the number of *ulamas* in the Shura depends on the number of provinces, counties or whatever regional division is chosen. This method of election is relevant, because we think it is essential that the members of the upper and lower chambers are chosen in two different ways. This is usually a demand in a bicameral system. E.g. see Lijphart (1999), p. 39.

As the name also implies, another very important function is that of the *constitutional court*. In chapter 4, we described that the right of constitutional scrutiny is an important supplementary element in order to fulfil the ideal criteria for democracy. The citizens of the Islamocracy cannot complain of the constitutionality of a law at the courts of justice. However, they can complain to Shura II⁴¹⁶ in case of a possible constitutional struggle concerning both laws and sentences. In cases where the Islamocracy becomes a federal state, Shura II also functions as a constitutional court which has the power of attorney over the agreement of regional laws with the constitution. We would like to point out that Shura II, besides the control of the constitutionality of laws and sentences, has no other judiciary powers. The foundation of Shura II is the internal consultation among the men of learning, otherwise it is voting in accordance with *ijma* (consensus or the principle of majority vote).

In short, Shura II conducts the functions of the constitutional court for the community and the political system, and thus, it is the guardian of the constitution.

Locally Based Democracy

Locally based democracy is one of the institutional arrangements which can bring democracy closer to the citizens, at the same time being an essential element in the development of the democratic competences of the citizens. In this way, more citizens get the opportunity to take part directly in the decision-making process. In connection with minority problems, we have mentioned a federation as a possibility, and in chapter 4 it has been described how public meetings, referenda, decentralization, and locally based democracy will increase the extent of democracy and improve the responsiveness of the political system to the citizens. In other words, we regard locally based democracy as an essential part of any democracy.

In the light of the results from the analysis, we have now finished our development of the model of Islamocracy, which is visualized below (figure 6.1.)

⁴¹⁶ One way Shura II could function as a constitutional court for citizens could be this: a special appointed *ulama* (religious man of learning) in Shura II is made a kind of ombudsman. In consultation with other *ulamas*, he takes a position on each of the citizens' complaints about possible disagreements among laws or sentences and the constitution. The ombudsman is appointed directly by Shura I for a certain period. The *ulamas*, who are going to give advice to the ombudsman, are elected internally by Shura II.

6.2 The Model of Islamocracy and The Answer to The Principal Question

First, we shall answer the principal question, and then we shall discuss the points where we think our work may be criticized.

6.2.1 The Answer to The Principal Question

The principal question of the thesis is: *How can Islam and democracy be united in a model of Islamic democracy?*

The answer has already been given in the last passage, so we can content ourselves with a very short answer in the shape of figure 6.1 on the next page.⁴¹⁷ We are aware of the fact that not all elements of the Islamocracy can be included in a figure, but it is our intention that this one shall provide a general view.

During our preparatory studies for the thesis, we did not find a comprehensive model of Islamic democracy, and so it became our aim to develop such a model. The islamocracy is the result of our work and our proposal for a combination of Islam and democracy. As described in the introduction, it was our aim to develop a relatively concrete model. By this we meant that our model should contain concrete solutions concerning the structure of the institutions and their interconnections. Furthermore, we demanded, that the model could be identified as a democratic one, and on the basis of Dahl's criteria we think it fulfils this demand. We have not gone into details with everything that such a model may contain, but the model contains the fundamental elements in order to be called a model of democracy. In this way we have reached our aim.

⁴¹⁷ We shall not comment on the figure, as it contains elements that have been described already (in paragraph 6.1).




Fig. 6.1 Islamocracy

6.2.2. A Critical Discussion of The Model of Islamocracy

In the light of a self-critical reading, in this passage, we shall point out some elements from the model that would benefit from further development. In the first part of the passage, we primarily look at our selection of material, and in the second part, the criticism is levelled against the model.

One could ask, why we ended up with this model in our thesis? We could have chosen other thinkers, another frame of reference, other countries, and we could have made other selections. In this way, one could easily think of other possibilities for an Islamic democracy, and thus, our model must be viewed as one possibility out of many. Maybe we have not included enough thinkers, maybe we have included the wrong ones, but we find that our criteria for selection are sufficient. We have made well-founded choices, even if some might claim that we have attached greater importance to democracy than to Islam. We acknowledge that the democratic point of departure has been important to us as we included this as a criterion for the model. On the other hand, others might blame us that the model is not sufficiently democratic because of the limited sovereignty under Allah. We are aware of the fact that this limitation is a considerable democratic problem, but the idea of an Islamic model is exactly that it must take Allah and his message as its point of departure. Thus, the limited sovereignty under Allah is necessary. We have tried to limit the undemocratic consequences of this by ensuring individual and collective rights to a great extent.

Finally, one might object that we are not Muslims and have no understanding of Islam, and as such we should refrain from dealing with such a subject. This argument may be right, and yet, the model is a proposal and a discussion paper.

Despite the fact that our model is rather concrete, it has ill-defined points, e.g. we have not been able to decide which limitations the thinkers refer to concerning freedoms and rights. If these are major limitations, it will reduce the democratic quality of the model considerably. Another question is, whether it is acceptable that one day a majority of the people may want a secular democracy in stead of an Islamic one. At present, this is uncertain. Also, the way our model attach importance to the religious men of learning may be criticized. We could have developed the model without this group being represented in a special way, and the interpretation of Islam could have been carried out on the basis of majority decisions in the parliament alone. Yet, we have given priority to the inclusion of the religious men of learning, as they are

much trusted by Muslims, and we find that we have taken a middle course by having them elected by the people.

After having discussed some of the critical points that would benefit from further development, we proceed with the conclusion.

7. Conclusion, Discussion, and Putting The Results into Perspective

In this chapter, we would like to give a survey of the thesis and its results. Subsequently, some typical arguments against Islamic democracy will be discussed, and the thesis is rounded off by putting into perspective the conclusion in order to discuss, whether a more constructive discourse in connection with democratization initiatives in the Muslim world could be recommended in the light of the thesis.

7.1 The Conclusion of The Thesis

The aim of the thesis and the principal question is:

How Can Islam and Democracy Be United in A Model of Islamic Democracy?

In order to answer this question, we have tried to combine Islam and democracy in one model. As far as we are concerned, such a model has not been constructed in spite of a wide-ranging political and political scientific debate. It was an important criterion to us that a model of Islamic democracy should have characteristics of democracy. In the answer to the principal question, we posed three sub-questions in which we wanted to include both normative and empirical elements.

In *chapter 2* we gave a short introduction to Islam and the Medina-model which is considered the original model of Islamic society by all Muslims.

In the light of this introduction to the important and - in this thesis - necessary Islamic concepts, we proceeded in *chapter 3* with a profound analysis of the ideas of four thinkers concerning the combination of Islam and democracy. In this part of the analysis, we were looking for traditional elements of democracy like the sovereignty of the people, a concept of equality, and a constitutional concept. The thinkers contributed with many ideas, which in several cases pointed to different elements. The chapter was finished by means of a synthesis of the different elements, and in the light of two concrete choices, we defined sovereignty as a limited sovereignty under Allah and provided the model with a parliamentary basis. We called this model a model of synthesis, and it was divided up into three variants: A, B and C. Thus, this

model was the answer to the first sub-question: *What can be understood by a model of Islamic democracy?*

In *chapter 4*, we analysed the model of synthesis in the light of Robert Dahl's model of democracy. The analysis showed that the A-variant of the model of synthesis, in which the limited sovereignty under Allah applied to all citizens, was definitely the most democratic one of the three variants. Thus, we chose variant A. Also, Dahl added elements to the model of synthesis such as locally based democracy, parliamentary constitution, and market economy. The second sub-question was: *To what degree can a model of synthesis be characterized as democratic according to Robert Dahl's models of democracy?* The answer to this question was the A-variant. Yet, there were still a democratic deficit and areas not sufficiently analysed, e.g. how freedoms and rights were limited, if women could be accepted as equal to men, how to solve the democratic problems concerning religious minorities, and also the very important question about how to and who were to interpret Islam.

In *chapter 5*, we wanted to analyse these last elements by including experiences from two Muslim countries. So the third and last sub-question was: *Can the two cases, Iran and Turkey, contribute with supplementary elements to the Islamic model of democracy?* Here we looked for solutions of e.g. the institutional organization of the state, the handling of minorities, the status of women, and the question of the interpretation of Islam. The case-studies from Iran and Turkey contributed with many instructive elements, which could be applied positively or negatively as atrocity propaganda. E.g. Iran showed good examples of how to solve the question of handling minorities, while Turkey was the pioneer concerning the equal rights of women. The answer to the third question was that the two countries to a great extent did contribute with supplementary elements to the Islamic model of democracy.

Each of the answers to the three sub-questions contributed to the final model of Islamic democracy. We were able to deduce specific elements from all of them, and also they functioned as a three stage rocket in which one chapter based its results on the previous one.

Thus, *Chapter 6* was a discussion and a summary of the elements from chapters 3, 4 and 5. Here we added elements from a supplementary theory of the minority question, too. The final result was a model of Islamic democracy, which we call the Islamocracy.

A more exact description of the Islamocracy would be a parliamentary government based on Islam. The basis of the model consists of two cornerstones, one is Islamic and consists of the Koran and *Sunna* (the usual practice of the prophet), the other is democratic and consists of the principles of political equality. The constitution must be the fundament of the state and balance the Islamic and the democratic elements. We have kept the sovereignty as a limited sovereignty under Allah for all citizens. In this way, we obtain a double legitimacy based on both a mandate and an agreement with the words of Allah. All citizens have the same freedoms and rights, and women are equal to men. Also, minorities have group-differentiated rights, i.e. rights of self-government, polytechnic rights, and special rights of representation. Elected religious men of learning are responsible for the official interpretation of Islam, but at the same time there must be room for private interpretation. There is a tripartition of the power, an executive, a legislative, and a judiciary. The executive consists of a government and a Prime Minister. The legislative consists of two chambers, an upper chamber and a lower chamber. The lower chamber is the elected parliament. The upper chamber is a kind of constitutional court consisting of elected religious men of learning. They control whether the draft bills are in agreement with the constitution, including the Islamic principles. The judiciary consists of independent courts of law. The judges are appointed for a certain period in order to obtain an up-to-date interpretation of Islam, and also they are religious persons with law degrees. The two chambers appoint them in common, and religious minorities can be put on trial with judges of their own faith.

Thus, the answer to the principal question of the thesis is that Islam and democracy can be united in a model of Islamic democracy. How to combine Islam and democracy is (in part) an expression of concrete choices, and our model is a proposal for how this may be done. We have shown that it is possible to maintain a rather high degree of democracy without the model becoming non-Islamic. An Islamic democracy can fulfil the criterion of political equality, and if it is constructed in a sensible and carefully prepared way, the religious elements can be combined with political participation, justified insight, and control with the agenda to a certain degree. At the same time, there is still room for the Islamic elements, both in the constitution, in the organization of the institutions which includes religious men of learning, in civil society, and economy.

In the light of this conclusion, our contribution is to be discussed with a point of departure in typical arguments against the combination of Islam and democracy.